Criminal Procedure -- Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional Procedure by Yates, Philip P. W.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 54 | Number 4 Article 8
4-1-1976
Criminal Procedure -- Michigan v. Mosley: A New
Constitutional Procedure
Philip P. W. Yates
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip P. Yates, Criminal Procedure -- Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional Procedure, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 695 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol54/iss4/8
1976] MICHIGAN v. MOSLEY
tion. While in Golden the rights of religious and racial minorities may
well outweigh the Club's associational rights, the case, as the firstf1
imposition of fourteenth amendment duties on what would traditionally
have been considered a private club, warrants a much fuller discussion
of the associational freedoms of the Club.
In sum, Golden's assault on the Club's membership practices was
misplaced because the Fifth Circuit refused to base its holding solely on
a Burton-Moose Lodge-Jackson state involvement analysis. Its reliance
on the lease as an adequate basis for finding state action seems to run
counter to the latest pronouncements on the issue by the Supreme Court.
The court's overly broad construction of state action was partly excusa-
ble because the Supreme Court has not articulated the relative import-
ance it attaches to the nature of the constitutional right asserted by
plaintiffs and the countervailing interests of private defendants. Unless
the high Court dispels the confusion that has arisen from its handling of
these cases, state action assaults on private discrimination will continue
to be hit-or-miss attacks.
MICHAEL W. PAmIcK
Criminal Procedure-Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional
Procedure
In Miranda v. Arizona' the United States Supreme Court set out
specific guidelines, which, if not followed, required that statements ob-
tained through custodial interrogation not be used against the accused.'
71. This conclusion depends on which definition of private club is used. Using the
definition discussed at note 17 supra, Golden represents the first decision imposing
constitutional restrictions on membership in a private social club. See 521 F.2d at 353
(Coleman, J., dissenting). But cf. Goodloe v. Davis, 514 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1975).
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Briefly stated Miranda held:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege of self-incrim-
ination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right to remain silent and to assure a continu-
ous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain si-
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Miranda embodied a decision3 that it was better for some guilty persons
to go free than to allow the police to engage in improper conduct.4 The
decision produced a strong adverse public reaction that has been partly
reflected5 in a series of decisions since 1971 that have expanded the
admissibility of custodially derived evidence.6 In Michigan v. Mosley7
the Court has again diminished the impact of Miranda by sanctioning
the renewed questioning of a suspect after an expressed desire to remain
silent. In doing so, the Court created a new constitutionally required
procedure-that the police must "scrupulously honor" the accused's
right to cut off questioning-but defined the procedure so vaguely that
it offers little guidance to lower courts or the police.
The defendant, Robert Mosley, was arrested pursuant to an anony-
mous tip implicating him in two recent robberies as well as a
robbery/murder that had occurred -three months previously. After
receiving his Miranda warnings from the arresting officer, Mosley said
that he did not want to answer "any questions about the robberies.""
Accordingly, that officer asked no more questions, and Mosley was
charged with the two recent robberies (but not with the robbery/mur-
der) and jailed. More than two hours later a different police officer
took Mosley to a different interrogation room and again informed him
of his rights. After Mosley waived his rights the officer proceeded to
question him about the murder, which had not been discussed at the
previous interrogation. Upon being confronted with an incriminating
statement of a confederate, Mosley confessed.9
The confession was admitted into evidence at Mosley's trial over
his objection that the second interrogation violated his constitutional
lent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If however, he indi-
cates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the in-
dividual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be inter-
rogated, the police may not question him.
Id. at 444-45 (footnote omitted).
3. Among those reasons were the danger of false confession resulting from the
psychological pressures of custodial interrogation, id. at 447-48, and "the respect a
government-state or federal-must accord the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Id.
at 460.
4. Id. at 457.
5. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1039
(1974).
6. See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975).




right against self-incrimination because his expressed desire to remain
silent was not honored.10 The conviction that resulted from his trial
was overturned by the Michigan Court of Appeals," holding that the
second interrogation was a per se violation of Miranda.12  The Michi-
gan Supreme Court refused further appeal,' 3 but the "United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
Justice Stewart, writing for five members of the Court,15 declared
the issue in the case to be whether the police conduct complained of
violated the Miranda guidelines so that Mosley's confession was inad-
missible at his trial.'6 Answering this question required interpretation
of the following passage from Miranda:
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to ex-
ercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked."'17
The Court rejected a reading of the passage that would result in
finding a per se violation of Miranda.' Instead, the Court adopted a
new rule that would exclude the use of custodially obtained statements if
the accused's right to cut off questioning, in light of all the circum-
10. Id. at 324.
11. People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974).
12. "Miranda cannot be circumvented by the simple expedient of shuttling a person
from one police officer to another for purposes of questioning and thus justifying
subsequent interrogations after an election to remain silent." Id. at 566.
13. People v. Mosley, 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
14. Michigan v. Mosley, 419 U.S. 1119 (1975).
15. The other four were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist. Justice White filed a concurrence, see text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, see text
accompanying notes 23 and 24 infra.
16. 96 S. Ct. at 324. The Court's formulation of the issue can be found in text
accompanying note 54 infra.
17. Id. at 325, quoting 384 U.S. at 473-74.
18. The Court noted that there were two literal interpretations of the passage that
"would lead to absurd and unintended results." The first would read the passage to
mean that once a person invoked his right, he could never again be questioned "by any
police officer at any time or place on any subject." The second would read it to require
only a momentary cessation and "permit a resumption of interrogation after a momen-
tary respite." 96 S. Ct. at 325.
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stances of the case, was not "scrupulously honored."'" Although the
Court did not attempt to define what "scrupulously honoring" an ac-
cused's right to cut off questioning means, the Court did hold that
Mosley's right was so honored, and that his confession was admissible.20
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on the following facts of the
Mosley case: the amount of time separating the two interrogations, the
different subject matter discussed at each session, the absence of discern-
able police techniques designed to wear down the accused, the different
interrogators, and the ambiguous nature of Mosley's statement that he
did not wish to answer questions about the "robberies."'2' Thus the
Court announced a new procedure to protect the accused's right to
remain silent, but declined to define it specifically.
While Justice White, concurring in the result, and Justices Brennen
and Marshall, dissenting, agreed with the majority that Miranda did not
create a per se proscription of renewed questioning for an indefinite
period, 22 both the concurrence and the dissent objected to the "scrupu-
lously honored" procedure. Justice White deplored the possibility that
some "voluntary" statements could be excluded under the procedure,
and would re-adopt the pre-Miranda rule of admitting any statement
that in view of all the circumstances was found to be voluntary.s
Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other hand, faulted the vagueness
of the new procedure and suggested instead that the Court adopt
19. Id. at 326. Although a violation of the "scrupulously honored" procedure
evidently would prevent the prosecution from using a statement so obtained to prove
Mosley's guilt, the State would still be able to use the statement for impeachment
purposes. See text accompanying notes 32-34 Infra.
20. 96 S. Ct. at 326, 328.
21. Id. at 326-27. See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
22. Id. at 328-30, 330-34. The Court's unanimous rejection of a per se proscrip-
tion of renewed questioning is in contrast to section 140.8(2)(d) of the ALI MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Prop. Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975), which
states: "No waiver shall be sought from an arrested person at any time after he has
indicated in any manner that he does not wish to be questioned or that he wishes to
consult counsel before submitting to questioning." In commenting on section
140.8 (2) (d), the Institute said:
As the investigation in the case develops, it may be quite natural for the police
to inquire of an arrested person whether he wished to change his mind and
make a statement or submit to questioning, and there may be cases where such
a change of mind can occur without any semblance of coercion. On the other
hand, even a seemingly voluntary waiver given after a person has once
indicated he does not wish to cooperate may be the product of subtle coer-
cion ....
Id. at 52.
23. 96 S. Ct. at 328-30. Justice White's test for admissibility would be virtually
identical to the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances" test for voluntariness and
admissibility. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 561 (1897).
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concrete, objective guidelines for the police to follow; if the guidelines
were ignored the statement taken upon requestioning would be exclud-
ed. 4 The dissent concluded that the "scupulously honored" procedure
"signals a rejection of Miranda's basic premise."25
The Miranda premise was that the combination of modem police
interrogation technique and a custodial setting,2 6 in which the accused
was cut off from familiar surroundings, produced an inherently coer-
cive27 effect such that the confession, although "voluntary" in traditional
terms,28 could not "truly be the product of his free choice."29  That
premise reflected the Court's judgment that the interest in the protection
of "precious Fifth Amendment rights ' 3 -not lessened because a confes-
sion was ostensibly voluntary-necessitated a presumption that a custo-
dial confession was the result of coercion unless the State could prove
that the confession resulted from an informed and intelligent waiver of
those rights."' To determine if those rights had been so waived, the
Court established concrete, objective guidelines which, if not followed,
required the exclusion of the accused's confession.32
The first indication that the Burger Court was inclined to broaden
the admissibility of "voluntary" statements taken in violation of Miranda
came in Harris v. New York.33 In that case the Court interpreted
Miranda to mean that a statement taken in violation of Miranda, if
trustworthy, could be used to impeach the accused if he chose to take
the stand. However, Harris continued to bar "the prosecution from
making its case" with a statement taken in violation of Miranda.34
The Harris theme was expanded in Oregon v. Hass.35 In that case
the Court allowed the use of a statement for impeachment purposes even
though it was taken in the absence of counsel after the accused ex-
pressed a desire to see an attorney. Thus, for impeachment purposes at
24. 96 S. Ct. at 332.
25. Id. at 333.
26. 384 U.S. at 449-54.
27. Id. at 458.
28. See note 22 supra.
29. 384 U.S. at 458.
30. Id. at 457.
31. Id. at 479.
32. See note 2 supra.
33. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
34. Id. at 224. "The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid
to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not
be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged thereby." Id. at 225.
35. 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975).
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least, the giving or not giving of Miranda warnings will not affect a
custodial confession.
The admissibility of custodial confessions was expanded further in
Lego v. Twomey.3" In that case the Court set the State's burden of
proof on the issue of the voluntariness of the accused's waiver of his
rights at the "preponderance of the evidence" level, rather than at the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" level.
But the decision that sheds the most light on the Burger Court's
attitude toward Miranda came in Michigan v. Tucker.37 In Tucker the
police failed to inform the accused that an attorney could be appointed
without cost to handle his case, and subsequently the accused made a
statement that led the police to a witness whose testimony implicated
Tucker in the crime. In declining to exclude this "fruit" of the state-
ment38 taken in violation of the Miranda guidelines, the Court used a
novel analytical framework to decide the case. 9
Before Tucker, the accused's fifth amendment right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination as such was considered violated unless the
Miranda guidelines, or some other set of procedures adequate to protect
the right, were followed. If such procedures were not followed, any
statement taken was automatically excluded. 40  The procedural rules set
out in Miranda were never deemed constitutionally protected 41 because
their violation was thought to violate the fifth amendment right itself: if
adequate procedures were not taken to inform the accused of his consti-
tutional rights, any statement was presumed to be taken in violation of
the right against compulsory self-incrimination. 42  However, Tucker
destroyed this identity by divorcing the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, as such, from the procedures that were taken to protect
36. 404U.S. 477 (1972).
37. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
38. A dog found at the scene of the crime (a rape) led the police to Tucker. The
police questioned Tucker about his activities on the night of the rape and he replied that
he had been with a man named Henderson. Henderson, however, gave the police
information that incriminated Tucker. Id. at 436-37.
39. "We will ... first consider whether the police conduct complained of directly
infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it
instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. We will then
consider whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded." Id. at
439.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. 384U.S.at467.
42. "The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
methods of interrogation." Id. at 476.
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that right.41 If the right itself were violated, then the statement would
still be excluded. But if only the procedures were violated, under
Tucker, the question remained whether that violation should require
exclusion of evidence derived from the interrogation."
In applying this analysis to the facts in Tucker, the Court found
that the accused's right against compulsory self-incrimination was not
violated because the police conduct in the case did not include "the
historical practices at which the right . . .was aimed."4" Evidently,
such "historical practices" are the crude police techniques used in the
past to compel confessions, such as torture,46 starvation, 17 or lengthy
incommunicado interrogation. 48  Since these practices were not found
in Tucker, the accused's fifth amendment right was held not violated,
and the Court's next inquiry was whether to exclude the evidence
derived from an interrogation that violated only the Miranda guide-
lines.49 Because the reliability of the evidence involved in Tucker was
not at issue, and because the interrogation took place before Miranda
was decided-so that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, the
deterrence of improper police conduct, would not be furthered-the
Court concluded that the violation of the Miranda guidelines in Tucker
should not trigger the exclusionary rule.50
Although the Court held that the police's pre-Miranda violation of
the Miranda procedure in Tucker would not trigger the exclusionary
rule, there was an implication in the case that a violation of a procedure
could trigger the exclusionary rule, even in a state proceeding." Exclu-
sion of evidence in a state proceeding, however, can be mandated by the
Supreme Court only in cases in which a constitutional right has been
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Id.
45. 417 U.S. at 444.
46. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
47. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
48. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
49. 417 U.S. at 446.
50. Id. at 450. As in Harris v. New York, note 32 and accompanying text supra,
the Tucker Court discounted or ignored the reasons set forth in Miranda, note 3 supra,
for the exclusionary rule and instead stressed deterrence as the main rationale for the
rule. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), the Court has developed
this to the point at which deterrence has become almost the sole justification for the rule.
And in Oregon v. Hass, note 34 and accompanying text supra, the Court refused to apply
the exclusionary rule even though without it the Court admitted the police would be
encouraged to act improperly. 95 S. Ct. at 1221.
51. "[1In deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be excluded, there is no
controlling . . . precedent to guide us." 417 U.S. at 446. By discussing whether
violation of the procedure should trigger the exclusionary rule, the Court is implying that
the violation could trigger the rule.
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violated.52 Thus, if the Supreme Court invokes the exclusionary rule in
a state court for the violation of a procedure designed to protect the
right against self-incrimination, it follows that the procedure must itself
be guaranteed by the Constitution. However, this conclusion is seem-
ingly contradicted by the Tucker holding that the Miranda guidelines
are "not themselves guaranteed by the Constitution."53  A possible
explanation of this apparent contradiction is that although the proce-
dures set forth in Miranda are not themselves constitutionally required,
there are some "constitutional" procedures, which if not followed, re-
quire the invocation of the exclusionary rule.
Michigan v. Mosley is the first case to identify such a "constitution-
al" procedure, although it did not do so explicitly. The elevation of a
procedure to a constitutional level in Mosley was accomplished through
the analysis set out in Tucker, although once again, this was not done
explicitly.
In Mosley the Court simply assumed, without discussion, that the
accused's right against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated.,4
Since Mosley did not assert that the police had employed "historical
practices" to obtain his confession, the Court evidently did not feel
constrained even to deliberate whether Mosley's confession was ob-
tained in violation of his fifth amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination, as such.
Instead, the Court immediately launched into the next stage of the
Tucker analysis, "whether the conduct of the Detroit police that led to
Mosley's incriminating statement did in fact violate the Miranda 'guide-
lines' so as to render the statement inadmissible against Mosley at his
trial. 55 The Court went on to identify the procedure in question to be
whether the police "scrupulously honored" the accused's right to cut off
questioning.5"
By formulating the issue in Mosley as quoted above, the Court
appeared to be answering by negative implication the final stage of the
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); United States v. Navarro, 441 F.2d 409, 411
(5th Cir. 1971); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAmy. L. REv. 43, 201 (1974);
Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A Warning About Miranda, 17 Aiuz. L. REv. 188, 197
(1975).
53. 417 U.S. at 444.
54. This conclusion is based on the total absence of discussion of the issue of
voluntariness of Mosley's confession.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 324.
56. Id. at 326.
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Tucker analysis: 57 that if a violation of the "scrupulously honored"
procedure is found, exclusion will follow. The validity of this negative
implication is reinforced by the Court's holding: "We therefore conclude
that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody
has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his
'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' ",58 Since
exclusion of evidence in a state court can only be triggered by a
constitutional violation, 59 it follows that the Court's new "scrupulously
honored" procedure is one guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although Mosley went beyond Miranda by creating a "constitu-
tional" procedure, it also disposed of the fundamental principle of
Miranda-that inherent coercion is always present in a custodial atmo-
sphere-by simply stating that the "scrupulously honored" procedure
"counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting."6  As
evidence of this "counteraction," the Court cited the more than two-
hour delay between interrogations. 61 But under Miranda, this delay
would be characterized as part of the custodial atmosphere that cannot
help but wear down the accused's will to resist.62  Similarly, the fact
that a different police officer conducted each interrogation and that
different subjects were discussed at each could also be cited as evidence
of inherent coercion rather than police respect for Mosley's rights.
Finally, the Court held that the police could "reasonably interpret'
Mosley's statement that he did not want to answer "any questions about
the robberies" as not applying to subsequent questioning concerning a
robbery/murder. 3 Although this interpretation is reasonable, an
equally reasonable reading would hold that the statement did apply to
the crime for which Mosley confessed.
By relying on circumstances peculiar to Mosley, and refusing to
define specifically under what circumstances renewed police question-
ing will be held to "scrupulously honor" an accused's right to cut off
57. The Court was able to avoid making an explicit ruling on the last stage of the
Tucker analysis, note 38 supra, by simply defining the procedural rule so that the police
conduct in question was found permissible.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 326 (emphasis added).
59. See note 51 supra.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 326.
61. Id.
62. mhe very passage of time, while a person continues to be in police de-
tention will create fears and pressures undermining the will to insist on one's
right to silence and right to counsel.. . . The Court's language in Miranda
seems to be consistent with this view: (citing passage quoted in text accom-
panying note 16 supra.
ALI MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(2)(d), comment at 52
(Prop. Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975).
63. 96 S. Ct. at 327.
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questioning, the Court has clearly rejected the Miranda approach of
providing concrete, objective guidelines which would enable a quick and
easy answer to the question whether the coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation had been overcome. Under the Mosley Court's vague
approach, each federal and state trial court must make a finding, based
on the facts unique to each case, whether the accused's right to cut off
questioning had been "scrupulously honored." The practical result will
be a lessening of appellate review in such cases because findings of fact
are difficult to overturn. 64  Consequently, the courts will, in all proba-
bility, admit confessions taken under conditions more coercive than
those that existed in Mosley."
It seems clear that the minority's conclusion that Mosley "signals
rejection of Miranda's basic premise" is correct.6 6  Mosley's holding,
that the inherent coercion of the custodial setting is dispelled by the
"scrupulous honoring" of the accused's right to cut off questioning, is
directly contrary to the principles of Miranda, which would hold that
"Mosley's failure to exercise the right upon renewed questioning was
presumptively the consequence of an overbearing in which detention
and that subsequent questioning played a central role." 67  Thus, Mir-
64. As a result of pre-Miranda ambiguity in the area of fifth amendment rights,
"Mhe Supreme Court repeatedly was presented with findings of voluntary confessions
in situations where the records made coercion quite likely. Powerless to overturn such
findings of fact, the Supreme Court stretched the definition of coercion to include the
lower courts' factual determinations." Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 5, at 1039. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968), in which
the court found as a matter of law that the defendant's confession was involuntary.
65. Let there be no mistake about it. To a mind-staggering extent-to an ex-
tent that conservatives and liberals alike who are not trial lawyers simply can-
not conceive-the entire system of criminal justice below the level of the Su-
preme Court of the United States is solidly massed against the criminal suspect.
Only a few appellate judges can throw off the fetters of their middle-class back-
grounds-the dimly remembered, friendly face of the school crossing guard,
their fear of a crowd of "toughs", their attitudes engendered as lawyers before
their elevation to the bench, by years of service as prosecutors or as private
lawyers for honest, respectable business clients-and identify with the criminal
suspect instead of with the policeman or with the putative victim of the sus-
pect's theft, mugging, rape, or murder. Trial judges still more, and magistrates
beyond belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police, their
co-workers in the unending and scarifying work of bringing criminals to book.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 785, 792 (1970).
See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972) (en bane)
(confession held admissible even though defendant declined to talk on four separate
occasions); United States v. Brady, 421 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1970) (confession admitted
despite four previous assertions of the right to silence); United States v. Choice, 392 F.
Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (confession held admissible even though severely injured
defendant declined to talk once, and refused to sign the waiver form at subsequent
interrogation).
66. 96 S. Ct. at 333.
67. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE
anda has been overruled in effect by Mosley. However, the case af-
firms Miranda in name and uses language from Miranda to identify the
first constitutionally required police procedure for custodial interroga-
tions.
But protecting a procedural right with the Constitution is of little
help to the accused if the "constitutional" procedure is defined so
vaguely that the police and courts can easily circumvent it. This
vagueness, combined with the Court's attitude of expanding the admissi-
bility of custodial confessions and a willingness to read facts to fit the
procedural requirement, seems certain to have the effect of freeing the
police from the restraint of' truly honoring the rights of the accused.
PILIP P.W. YATES
Criminal Procedure-The Right to Proceed Pro Se: Judicial
Gymnastics with the Sixth Amendment
Within the past two decades the United States Supreme Court has
been zealous in ensuring the right of defendants in state criminal
prosecutions to receive the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment
guarantee of assistance of counsel to defendants in federal criminal
prosecutions has been extended to state criminal prosecutions under the
auspices of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The
underlying premise of the "assistance of counsel" cases is that inherent
unfairness exists in any criminal proceeding in which the accused has
been denied the assistance of counsel to prepare his defense.' Argua-
bly, a natural extension of this reasoning might indicate that any convic-
tion obtained in a criminal trial absent representation by an attorney for
the accused is per se tainted and unfair. However, such an extension
clashes with an attempt by a criminal defendant to exercise the right of
self representation recognized on either a constitutional or a statutory
level by most state and all federal courts. This quandary raises the
question whether a state may constitutionally deny a valid request by a
1. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requirement of assistance of
counsel before imprisonment for any offense); Gideon v. Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (requirement of assistance of counsel for defendants in state felony prosecu-
tions); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requirement of assistance of counsel
for defendants in state capital offense prosecutions).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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